Why, readers might ask themselves, does this issue of the journal contain a paper on brain tissue transplantation and personal identity' -what is the connection between this and medical ethics, the journal's subject matter? Certainly the paper does not address the usual medical ethics issues associated with transplantation, such as benefits and harms to recipients, donors and society; respect for autonomy of recipients and donors or their proper proxies; use of different sorts of donors including fetuses, animals and living people; just distribution of resources whether in therapy or research; respect for people's rights; issues oflegal justice, or ethical problems associated with the concept and criteria of brain death.
Instead the paper by Dr The fundamental problem that would arise from such whole body transplantation is the confusion and distress about personal identity that it would create. For while our sense of personal identity is essentially one of our own experience -our continuity of consciousness, stretching back into our past in memory, taking in our current experiences and projected through our imagination into our futurenonetheless we also identify with our body, within which and through which we have those experiences and express our personalities; and, crucially, it is through the appearance and actions of other people's bodies that we identify those other people.
Thus over and above the standard ethical problems associated with organ transplantation, brain transplantation can also bring with it potentially major additional medico-moral problems associated with issues of personal identity.
We cannot here enter the long and complex philosophical debate about which changes produce a change in identity and which changes are simply changes in the same persisting entity, important as these issues are in relation especially to personal identity and morality. Suffice it to note that not all changes, whether to our bodies or to our minds, either negate our continuing identity with ourselves or are morally undesirable. Indeed apart from the constant changes we all undergo, almost all medical interventions change us in body and/or mind. But they don't necessarily or indeed usually change our identities.
Even the major change of whole brain transplantation -or of whole body transplantation -can be seen, as above, not to entail a fundamental change in identity so much as an apparent change in identity; and the major additional ethical problems it would create relate not strictly to a change in personal identity (which remains that of the person-of-the-i living-brain) so much as to the confusion and distress caused to all by this apparent change in personal identity. 
